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When the Boeing Company (Boeing) in the summer of 1997 publicly announced its
intent to acquire a majority interest in the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, this triggered
the interest of not only business magazines and the companies' competitors, but also of
antitrust authorities around the world. The result was a highly publicized struggle between
Boeing and, in particular, the European Commission. As the guardian of competition in
the European Union, one of the world's leading markets for airplane manufacturers, the
European Commission's proceedings with Boeing nearly led to a trade war between the
European Union and the United States. This demonstrated once again the paramount
economic and political impact of a merger of such magnitude and the principal positions
that collide when its consequences are assessed. Boeing and the U.S. government empha-
sized the national interest in saving jobs by merging the two airplane manufacturers whereas
the European Commission and Boeing's competitors claimed their concern for free and
fair competition was endangered by the combination of two major players in that market.
Since the European Commission found Boeing already had a market-dominating position
in the worldwide market for large commercial jet aircraft, the European Commission held
that serious effects on competition in that market would result from the proposed trans-
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action and, therefore, made clear that it would not allow the transaction to be executed in
the originally intended form. Following an intensive five-month negotiation between rep-
resentatives of the European Commission and Boeing, however, the European Commission
ultimately decided to declare the acquisition compatible with the Common Market, subject
to full compliance with several commitments made by Boeing.'
To those not professionally engaged in international transactions, it may be surprising
that a European institution is concerned about the acquisition of an American company by
another American company and that it considers the legality of such a transaction. The
reason is that the European Commission is entitled under the Treaty of Rome to control
the anticompetitive effects of mergers on the Common Market, no matter where the trans-
actions are executed, where the participating companies have their seats, or where they
were founded.'
The German antitrust provisions set forth within the German Act Against Restraints of
Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbescbrankungen (GWB))4 follow the same approach
of controlling foreign mergers. In this context, foreign mergers mean transactions that are
not concluded or carried out in Germany but have an appreciable effect in German territory.
According to section 130(2), the GWB is applicable to all transactions that restrain com-
petition and have effects on competition within Germany, even if the transactions occur
outside of Germany. As under the European regime, the applicability of the GWB does
not depend on the registered seat of the enterprises involved or the country in which or
under the laws of which a merger agreement was concluded or is carried out, but rather on
whether a merger might have an effect on the competition in the territory for which the
antitrust authority is competent (Effect Approach). Therefore, if such effect is considerable
(the meaning of which is explained in detail in Part IV.B), the requirements of the GWB
to give notice of merger projects to the Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt (FCO)) in
Bonn5 are applicable and the FCO (subject to the restrictions described in Part VI.D) is
authorized to prohibit the transaction.
The GWB has recently been amended. Following a long period of deliberation, the
German Parliament passed the Sixth Amendment of the GWB6 (Amendment) on May 7,
1998. The goals of the Amendment are to harmonize the GWB to a greater extent with
the law of the European Union, to incorporate further practical experiences under the
former law, and to heed recent economic and political developments. The revised form of
the GWB became effective as of January 1, 1999.
The Amendment did not only completely restructure and renumber the GWB but also
changed it substantially in several parts. Whereas the wording of many provisions was kept
2. For details regarding the effects on competition and the commitments of Boeing, see Commission De-
cision, 1997 O.J. (L 336/16), and press information of the European Commission, IP 729 (1997), each as of
July 30, 1997.
3. Article 85 (now Article 81) (1) of the Treaty of Rome prohibits"... all agreements between undertakings,
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within
the common market." See, e.g., Commission Decision of December 21, 1988 O.J. (L 74), 1, 14, 21, 34 (1989);
CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY & GRAHAM D. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 2-147 (4th ed. 1993).
4. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrinkungen, 59 FEDERAL LAW GAZETTE [Bundesgesetzblatt] pt. 1, 2547-
75 (Sept. 2, 1998) [hereinafter GWB].
5. The seat of the FCO moved from Berlin to Bonn in 1999.
6. Sechstes Gesetz zur Anderung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbesch6nkungen, GAZETrE OF THE FED-
ERAL COUNCIL [Bundesratsdrucksachel 418 (May 8, 1998).
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intact and the Act merely renumbered, the merger control provisions, for instance, were
revised materially. For this reason, this article will outline the new merger control require-
ments as provided in the revised Act by focusing on foreign mergers, particularly on the
acquisition of assets or shares in an enterprise with a registered seat outside of Germany.
With respect to the fact that the Amendment has only recently been passed, the following
statements to some extent are based on the previous practice of the FCO, court decisions,
and the literature regarding the former provisions of the GWB on the one hand, and the
reasons for the Amendment as laid out in the Draft of the Amendment that the Federal
Government issued on November 11, 1997, 7 on the other.
The remarks give a brief outline of the main legal requirements and the questions usually
raised. With respect to the individuality of the facts, given the specific circumstances that
might be considerable in each case, and the limited purpose of this article, any foreign
merger notification clearly requires the individual legal assistance of experienced lawyers
before taking or refraining from any action.
When giving legal assistance to clients from abroad, the following questions, in particular,
are often raised and are referred to in this article:
" Must a notification be filed and, if so, at what point in time?
" Which authority will be competent: the FCO or the European Commission?
" Which facts and information must be presented in the filing?
" How long will the procedures last?
" What are the consequences for a failure to notify? and
" Under what circumstances will the authorities prohibit the merger?
II. General Remarks
In general terms, if the GWB is applicable, the enterprises may have to observe notifi-
cation requirements and should recognize the authority of the FCO to levy fines for failures
to notify and even to prohibit the transaction under certain circumstances.
The decision as to whether a filing of a merger must be made at all and, if so, to which
authority and at what point in time during the schedule for the transaction the filing must
occur, particularly depends on the kind and size of the proposed transaction and the parties
concerned. Briefly, under German as well as under European law, the authorities have to
be notified of mergers before consummation, depending on the turnover the participating
enterprises generated in the preceding fiscal year. Unlike, for instance, the laws of the
United Kingdom or France, which refer alternatively to a turnover threshold or a market
share threshold,' neither European Union law nor German law refer to a specific market
share threshold beyond which a notification is triggered. Instead, they only refer to turnover
thresholds.
In summary, notification to the FCO is mandatory if the general notification require-
ments of the GWB are met, in particular, if the transaction does not fall within the scope
7. Gesetzesentwurf der Bundesregierung eines Sechsten Gesetzes zur Anderung des Gesetzes gegen Wert-
bewerbsbeschrinkungen, GAZETrE OF THE FEDERAL COUNCIL 852 (Nov. 11, 1997).
8. Regarding French law, see Law No. 86-1243, art. 38 (Dec. 1, 1986); with respect to the law of the United
Kingdom, see OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, MERGERS: A GUIDE TO PROCEDURES UNDER THE FAIR TRADING ACT
1973, ch. 2, 2.2. lit. d (i) (1997).
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of the EU Merger Control Regulation (see infra Part III) and, in the event of a merger
carried out outside of Germany, if the GWB applies to the transaction (see infra Part V).
Notification to the FCO is formalized (see infra Part V) and its authority is considerable
even though foreign mergers are only subject to limited control (see infra Part VI). The
article concludes with a brief glossary of important terms (see infra Part VII).
III. Requirement to Notify the FCO of a Merger
The provisions of merger control under German law are set out under sections 35 to 43
of the GWB (until 1998, sections 23-24a). According to sections 35 and 39(1), notification
to the FCO is mandatory if the proposed merger does not fall within the scope of the
European law (see infra Part IILA), the participating enterprises achieve certain turnover
figures (see infra Part III.B), and there is, in terms of section 35, neither an affiliation nor
an insignificant market concerned (see infra Part III.C).
A. EU MERGER CONTROL REGULATION NOT APPLICABLE
The EU Merger Control Regulation (Regulation)9 applies exclusively to mergers that
have a Community Dimension as defined in article 22 of the Regulation. According to
article 1(2) of the Regulation, a Community Dimension is present where
" the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the enterprises concerned is more
than ECU 5 billion; and
" the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the enterprises
concerned is more than ECU 250 million;
" unless each of the enterprises concerned generates more than two-thirds of its aggregate
Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State of the European
Union.
Additionally, in accordance with article 1(3) of the Regulation, which entered into force on
March 1, 1998,10 a Community Dimension is present if
" the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the enterprises concerned is more
than ECU 2.5 billion;
" in each of at least three Member States, the combined aggregate turnover of all of the
enterprises concerned is more than ECU 100 million;
" in each of at least three Member States, the aggregate turnover of at least two of the
enterprises concerned is more than ECU 25 million; and
" the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the enterprises
concerned is more than ECU 100 million;
9. Council Regulation 4064/89, 1990 OJ. (L 257) 13, amended by 1997 OJ. (L 180) 1.
10. A revision of the scope of the aforementioned Regulation was subject to intense political discussion in
recent years. Finally, on June 30, 1997, the Council of the European Union agreed that the current thresholds
of article 1(2) of the Regulation should not be reduced but the scope of the Regulation extended by introducing
this paragraph 3 into article 1 of the Regulation. The purpose of this amendment was to heed the significant
cross-border effects of such mergers and to reduce the burden of multiple filings with national antitrust au-
thorities in a number of different Member States.
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* unless each of the enterprises concerned generates more than two-thirds of its aggregate
Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State.
Notably, though the wording of the Regulation has not been amended yet, the thresholds
now are calculated with reference to the EURO. According to article 21 of the Regulation,
transactions concerning enterprises whose turnover figures surpass these thresholds must
be filed only with the European Commission and no notification of the national antitrust
authorities is required (one-stop-shop doctrine). The GWB expressly does not apply to
mergers that fall into the scope of the exclusive competence of the European Commission."
Please note that the notification to the European Commission has to observe the formal
requirements provided in the Regulation (in particular the Form CO), which is not a subject
of this article.
If, upon proper notification, the European Commission concludes that the merger does
not fall into the scope of the Regulation, the Commission will declare itself not competent
and automatically and without an express transition by the European Commission, the
relevant national antitrust authorities will gain competence to assess the merger. 2 However,
even in cases where the Regulation applies, the national antitrust authorities might become
competent to decide on the merger if the European Commission, under circumstances
provided for in article 9 of the Regulation, refers the notified merger to them. In such cases,
an additional notification to the FCO shall not be required if the FCO is in possession of
the information requested under section 39(3) GWB and if the information is in German
as required by section 39(4) GWB.
B. THRESHOLDS UNDER THE GWB
The GWB formerly, that is until 1998, distinguished between a post-merger notification
(Anzeige), which was mandatory in all instances in which a merger had been consummated
and where the aggregate turnover of the participating parties in the preceding fiscal year
equaled or exceeded DM 500 million, and a pre-merger notification (Anmeldung), which
was required for planned mergers in which any single participating enterprise in the last
fiscal year achieved a turnover of at least DM 2 billion or two of the participating companies
achieved a turnover of at least DM 1 billion each. The amended GWB, however, refrains
from making any such distinction.
The amended GWB now requires pre-merger notification of all merger plans in which
the participating enterprises (in the preceding fiscal year) achieved a combined worldwide
turnover exceeding DM 1 billion and, additionally, at least one participating enterprise
achieved a turnover within Germany exceeding DM 50 million, 3 unless the "affiliation" or
the "insignificant market" exemption is given.
C. NEITHER AFFILIATION NOR INSIGNIFICANT MARKET
The merger control provisions under the GWB do not apply to mergers that are con-
sidered to have only minor effects on the competition since they merely constitute an
11. GWB § 35(3).
12. See Heinz F. L6ffler, Art. 21 of the Regulation, in KOMMENTAR ZUM DEUTSCHEN UND EUROPXISCHEN
KARTELLRECHT annot. 5 (Eugen Langen & Hermann-Josef Bunte eds., 8th ed. 1998) [hereinafter Langen &
Bunte].
13. GWB §§ 35(1) and 39(1).
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affiliation process or concern insignificant markets. 14 In detail, sections 35-43 GWB do not
apply to planned mergers in as far as
an enterprise, which is not a dependent company under section 36(2) GWB (see infra
Part VILA), and which generated in the preceding fiscal year a worldwide turnover of
less than DM 20 million, is merged with another enterprise (affiliation); or
a market is affected in which goods or commercial services have been offered for at
least five years and which, in the last calendar year, showed a turnover volume of less
than DM 30 million (insignificant market).
Where the merger plan concerns competition in the production and distribution of news-
papers, magazines, or parts thereof, only the insignificant market provision applies."5
D. CONSEQUENCES OF THE REQUIREMENT TO NOTIFY THE FCO
If the aforementioned facts exist, the FCO must be notified of the merger plan before
its consummation.1 6 The details of such pre-merger notification are described under section
V below.
According to section 41(1) GWB, the parties to a merger agreement that are not yet
released by the FCO may neither consummate the transaction nor participate in its con-
summation within one month following the FCO's receipt of the complete notification.
The one-month period can be extended within the discretion of the FCO by three months
to a total of four months if the FCO informs the notifying enterprise(s) by formal letter
within the first month (one-month letter) that it has entered into a "Phase II" investigation
(Hauptpriifverfahren) of the merger plan and needs further time or information to decide
on the merger. The FCO can release a transaction subject to conditions 7 (see infra Part
VI.A.3). If the one-month or the additional three-month period, respectively, expires with-
out a decision by the FCO releasing or prohibiting the merger project, the planned merger,
according to section 40(2) GWB, is deemed to be released unless:
* the notifying enterprises agreed to prolong the investigation period;
* the FCO failed to provide the one-month letter or issue a prohibition due to inaccurate
or delayed information rendered by the enterprises; or
* in the case of an enterprise not having its seat in Germany, the enterprise failed to
designate a recipient for the FCO's decisions within Germany.
Upon request, the FCO can release the enterprises from the ban against consummation
if the enterprises present good cause for such release, in particular, in order to avoid sub-
stantial harm to an enterprise concerned or any third party." The FCO could suspend the
ban at any time and impose conditions. The draft of the Amendment indicates that par-
ticularly in those cases of foreign mergers where it is impossible to provide the FCO with
all required information in due time (see infra Part V.B), as well as in cases of mergers in
14. Id. § 35(2).
15. See infra Part VII.D for calculating the turnover figures of publishing companies.
16. GWB § 39(1).
17. Id. § 40(3).
18. Id. § 41(2).
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the course of restructuring a failing company (Sanierungfusionen), such a good cause might
be given.
The parties must also give notice of the consummation of a merger plan that has been
notified to the FCO immediately after such consummation. 9 As reference need merely be
made to the contents of the pre-merger notification filing, however, such notifications usu-
ally consist of only five or six lines.
IV. Applicability of the GWB on Mergers Realized Abroad
According to section 130(2) GWB (formerly section 98(2)), the GWB applies to all
restraints of competition that have effects within Germany, that is, if they have a Domestic
Effect, even if they are the result of agreements concluded or carried on outside of Germany.
The approach in theory is that mergers might have a restraining effect on competition by
supporting the process of concentration and resulting in a reduction of the number of
competitors in a market. Therefore, if there is a merger in terms of the GWB and if the
turnover of the relevant parties exceeds the aforementioned thresholds, the parties have to
provide notice of the merger and it is not particularly necessary to further identify or prove
any real effects for German markets in order to assess whether a notification must be made.
As a result, the notification requirements under sections 35-43 GWB set forth above, and
the authority of the FCO to prohibit mergers under certain conditions (see infra Part VIA),
are applicable even to mergers exercised abroad if they might have a Domestic Effect.
The GWB does not provide for further details regarding the particular circumstances
under which mergers may produce effects on German markets. According to the courts,20
any potential effect that is likely to result in a predictable, concrete, direct, and significant
influence on the market structure in Germany is deemed to be a Domestic Effect in terms
of the GWB.
In order to indicate its understanding of the law and to help enterprises contemplating
a merger to assess the notification requirements, in January 1999, the FCO published a
memorandum on Domestic Effects within the meaning of section 130(2) GVB in the case
of mergers, which provides further insight into the authority's interpretation of that pro-
vision.2' Since the FCO is the competent authority to decide on the legality of a merger
with respect to the GVVB, its understanding of the law is obviously of significant importance
to the enterprises participating in a merger project.
Within its memorandum, the FCO distinguishes between mergers realized within Ger-
many (i.e., the target company's seat is in Germany) and those realized abroad (i.e., the
target company's seat is not in Germany).
19. Id. § 39(6).
20. See Judgment of the Supreme Court of May 29, 1979, in WIRTSCHAFT UNI WETrBEWERB, ENTSCHEI-
DUNGSSAMMLUNG ZUM KARTELLRECHT, BUNDESGERICHTSHOF [Economy and Competition, Compilation of
Anti-trust Decisions, Supreme Court] [hereinafter WuW/E BGH] 1613, 1615 (1979); Judgment of the Kam-
mergericht [Court of Appeals of Berlin] of July 1, 1983, in WIR'rsCHAFT UND WETrBEWERB, ENTSCHEIDUNGS-
SAMMLUNG ZUM KARTELLRECHT, OBERLANDESOERICHTE [Economy and Competition, Compilation of Anti-trust
Decisions, Courts of Appeals] [hereinafter WuW/E OLG] 3051, 3063 (1983).
21. Such memorandum is an update of a respective memorandum on the interpretation of the former section
98(2) GWB that was published already in 1975.
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A. MERGERS REALIZED WITHIN GERMANY
Mergers realized within Germany always have a Domestic Effect within the meaning of
section 130(2) GWB. Such mergers include, for instance, the acquisition of assets or shares
in a German company or the formation of a joint venture in Germany, even if the ac-
quirer/founder is a foreign enterprise.
Notably, under section 36(2) GWB (see infra Part VII.A), a company and all its subsidi-
aries are considered one economic entity. Therefore, a merger of enterprises realized abroad
is also deemed to constitute a merger of their German subsidiaries and, consequently, is
considered to be realized in Germany. Until 1998, the text of the GWB provided for this
approach expressly in section 23(3), sentence 4. The FCO, within its memorandum, con-
firms that it still shares that view.
B. MERGERS REALIZED ABROAD
A merger realized abroad has a Domestic Effect if the merger influences the conditions
for domestic competition by changing the market structure in Germany.2 Pointing out that
each case might require an evaluation of its particularities, the FCO distinguishes four
constellations of main importance: if before the merger, both enterprises (see infra Part
IV.B.1), only one (see infra Part IV.B.2), or none (see infra Part T.B.3) of the enterprises
entering into the merger abroad already were engaged in business in Germany, and the
formation of a joint venture (see infra Part IV.B.4). In detail, the FCO states as follows:
" A Domestic Effect is always given if both enterprises, either directly or via subsidiaries,
branches, or importers, were already engaged in business within Germany before the
merger.
* A Domestic Effect might be given although before the merger only one enterprise was
engaged in business in Germany if, for example:
" Production relations (higher and lower production level) or relations between the
range of products of the enterprises following the merger are likely to lead to a foreign
participant delivering goods into Germany. Whether such future deliveries into Ger-
many are likely usually depends on whether goods of the same or similar kind are
already traded between the countries involved, and whether there are no technical or
administrative trade barriers to such deliveries.
" The merger results in a considerable increase of know-how23 or financial resources
of a German enterprise or if intellectual property rights (e.g., patents, licenses) are
transferred to the German enterprise.
" In rare cases, the FCO will assume a Domestic Effect even if before the merger none
of the enterprises had subsidiaries or branches in Germany if such merger, nevertheless,
has influence on the market structure in Germany. As an example, the FCO refers to
the acquisition of the assets of an Austrian airline by another Austrian airline when the
target company merely serves flight connections within Germany.
" Regarding the establishment ofjoint ventures realized abroad, the Domestic Effect pri-
marily depends on the products concerned and the geographical area in which the joint
22. SeeJudgment of the Supreme Court of May 29, 1979, in WuW/E BGH, supra note 20, at 1613, 1615
(1979).
23. Cf. Judgment of the Supreme Court of May 29, 1979, in id.
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venture operates. The FCO assumes a Domestic Effect not only if the joint venture
shall be engaged in business in Germany but also if it is active in a European or world-
wide market.
C. TURNOVER IN GERMANY OF AT LEAST DM 50 MILLION
Besides the requirement of the Domestic Effect, notice of a merger must only occur if
the turnover thresholds are also fulfilled. In particular, even if a merger has a Domestic
Effect in terms of the aforementioned, the parties are not requested to give notice of the
merger if at least one party (including subsidiaries) did not achieve a turnover of at least
DM 50 million within Germany 4 (see supra Part III.B).
Notably, according to the memorandum, the FCO considers a merger involving a target
company that already on its own achieves a turnover in excess of DM 50 million in Germany
usually as having a Domestic Effect. As a result, the parties have to assess the Domestic
Effect of the intended merger in detail only in case of mergers realized entirely or almost
entirely abroad, that is, if the acquirer has a turnover of at least DM 50 million in Germany
and the target enterprise or the joint venture company is situated abroad.
V. Notification Procedure
A. RESPONSIBILITY
According to section 39(2) GWB, the participating enterprises and, in the case of asset
deals and share deals, the sellers are responsible for fulfilling the notification requirement.
B. TIME FRAME
The possible time frame for a pre-merger notification has already been discussed above
(see supra Part III.B). The FCO must inform the enterprises within one month following
receipt of the complete notification about whether the FCO has decided to review the
proposed merger more closely and, therefore, whether it needs a prolongation of the review
period for another three months. The FCO, however, will usually respond to a filing within
the first two weeks and, in most cases, decide within the one-month period.
Notably, the Federal Minister of Economics (Bundesministerfir Wirtschaft) instructed the
FCO in 1980 to observe specific rules when handling pre-merger notifications of foreign
mergers. Based on these instructions, the FCO, according to the aforementioned memo-
randum on Domestic Effects in January 1999, will inform the participating enterprises even
on the basis of an incomplete notification immediately after such notification that the
merger is released if:
* the enterprises plausibly claim that, due to applicable provisions of foreign law or other
specific reasonable grounds, they are unable to provide the FCO with all of the infor-
mation required before consummation; and
* it is already clear from the information rendered or other information that there will
be no creation or strengthening of a market-dominating position.
24. GWB § 35(1) no. 2.
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C. CONTENTS OF THE NOTIFICATION
Notice to the FCO requires a detailed description of the type of merger (e.g., number
of shares acquired and amount of the total participation), the participating enterprises, and
the German markets concerned. The description of the enterprises shall include at least
the precise name and seat of the enterprises and their German branches, a brief outline of
their businesses, a chart indicating affiliates and their participation in Germany, the last
available figures for turnover worldwide, the turnover within the Common Market, and
the turnover achieved in Germany (e.g., production figures by deducting exports and adding
imports) broken down to the fields of activity affected by the merger. Whether and which
additional information must be presented to the FCO depends on the specific case, par-
ticularly on the information the FCO already gained from other proceedings in that market.
Additionally, the participating enterprises must assess the volume of the German markets
affected by the merger and their respective market shares. Depending on the kind of goods
or services that are the subject of the transaction, it is often necessary to render additional
information in order to enable the FCO to determine the market in terms of interchange-
ability from the consumers' point of view (see infra Part VILE). Usually, the FCO requests
the enterprises to indicate the names, addresses, and estimated market shares of their most
important competitors. Moreover, according to section 39(3) sentence 2 no. 4 GWB, the
participating enterprises must name any German market within which they have combined
market shares equaling or exceeding twenty percent. Notably, this applies even with respect
to markets that are not affected by the merger.
The enterprises are requested to explain the bases for the estimations regarding the
market shares. Therefore, where appropriate, one should refer to official statistical infor-
mation from the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistiscbes Bundesamt) or other national
or European public institutions, or from associations of manufacturers of the products in
question. The enterprises will usually forward their annual reports to the FCO in order to
evidence their sales, business activities, branches, and affiliates.
Notably, the filing must be made in German. Furthermore, foreign enterprises are re-
quested to indicate a recipient for the FCO's decisions in Germany within their notification.
D. PUBLICATION
If notice of a merger project has been given in accordance with section 39 GWB, the
type of such merger, the corporate names, the seats, and the kind of business of the par-
ticipating enterprises are published in the Federal Legal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger) after con-
summation of the merger." Moreover, the decision in the event of an investigation, any
request for a ministerial dispensation, and the dispensation itself will be published.
Apart from this information and during the investigation periods, the FCO is obliged by
law to keep the merger, its details, and the information on the enterprises confidential.
E. FEES
The FCO charges fees for the notification proceedings in accordance with section 80(1)
and (2) no. 1 GWB. No additional fee will be charged for notification of the merger con-
summation.
25. Id. § 43.
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The maximum fee is ordinarily DM 100,000, and in extraordinary cases, DM 200,000.26
The calculation of the fee is within the reasonable discretion of the FCO and depends
on the personnel and material expenses of the FCO considering the economic significance
of the subject matter.27 Having set the fees for a merger of average impact at DM 50,000
as a standard, the FCO determines the economic impact of the planned merger in question,
considering the volume of the turnover the participating enterprises achieve in the German
markets concerned, the expected economic advantages of the merger in Germany, and the
economic interest of the enterprises with regard to the FCO's decision.2"
The (inconsiderable) costs of the publication in the Federal Legal Gazette also must be
reimbursed by the participating enterprises.2 9
VI. Authority of the FCO
A. PROHIBITION OF A MERGER PROJECT AND DISSOLUTION
According to section 36(1) GWB, the FCO must prohibit a merger if it is anticipated
that the merger will create or strengthen a market-dominating position unless the partici-
pating enterprises provide evidence that the transaction will also result in improvements of
the competitive conditions and that these improvements will outweigh the disadvantages
of the market domination.
The GWB defines a market-dominating position in section 19(2) and (3) GWB. An
enterprise is market dominating as offeror or demander of goods or services if:
" it is without competitors or it is not subject to substantial competition; 30
" it has a superior market position in relation to its competitors by taking into account
the market shares, financial resources, its access to supply or sales markets, participation
in other enterprises, legal or factual barriers to enter markets, factual or potential com-
petition by enterprises resident within Germany and abroad, the ability to change the
range of products or commercial services offered or demanded, as well as vice versa
the ability of the enterprises buying goods from or selling goods to the enterprise in
question to change their range of products or commercial services; 31 or
" two or more enterprises are market dominating if there is, for factual reasons, no sub-
stantial competition between these enterprises regarding certain products and if these
enterprises together fulfill the requirements of section 19(1) sentence 1 (nos. 1 and/or
2) GWB.
Moreover, according to section 19(3) sentence 1 GWB, market domination is assumed if
an enterprise achieves a market share of at least 33.3 percent.
Some enterprises together are deemed market dominating if:
26. Id. § 80(2) sentences 2 (1) and 3.
27. Id. § 80(2) sentence 1.
28. See Judgment of the Court of Appeals of Berlin of April 28, 1988, in WuW/E OLG, supra note 20, at
4366; Judgment of the Court of Appeals of Berlin of March 30, 1994, in id. at 5259, 5260; Judgment of the
Court of Appeals of Berlin of March 11, 1994, in id. at 5287-5288.
29. See GWB § 80(1) sentence 3.
30. See id. § 19(2) sentence 1 no. 1.
31. See id. § 19(2) sentence 1 no. 2.
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* three or fewer enterprises together achieve a market share of fifty percent; or
* five or fewer enterprises together achieve a market share of 66.6 percent unless the
enterprises prove the likelihood of substantial competition even after consummation of
the merger plan, or unless the enterprises altogether have no superior market position
in relation to their competitors. 2
The FCO's approach to evaluating the effects of a planned merger on the competition
in a market is very broad-based and it attempts to account for all specific circumstances. In
particular, the FCO not only considers the market shares involved but also, for instance,
technical or legal barriers to enter the market or the financial resources of the acquirer
(deep-pocket doctrine) and the actual or potential competition between companies active
within or even outside of Germany." In cases of foreign mergers, only those resources can
be taken into consideration that might in some way influence the conditions for competition
in Germany.
In order to avoid a prohibition of the merger project, the parties might offer the FCO
to take specific measures, in particular to divest assets or subsidiaries or parts thereof, if it
is feared that a market-dominating position will otherwise be created or strengthened. In
highly concentrated markets such commitments are often prerequisites for the release of a
merger project. The possibility to release a merger project upon the condition of the exe-
cution of certain actions agreed between the FCO and the parties has been incorporated
into the GWB in the course of the Amendment, while formerly such commitments were
only acknowledged by court decision. The kind and scope of such commitments are to
some extent within the discretion of the FCO; however, it is not permitted to establish
permanent control of the conduct of the participating enterprises.14
The decision to prohibit the merger can be appealed to the court of appeals in Diisseldorf
within one month following the decision.
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the Federal Minister of Economics
can be asked for a dispensation from the prohibition by the FCO if the restraint of com-
petition is outweighed in the specific case by national economic advantages or if there is a
public interest of paramount importance." However, such circumstances are rarely present
and, therefore, releases according to section 42 GWB (formerly section 24(3) GWB) have
been (and in all likelihood will continue to be) seldom granted.
B. CONSEQUENCES OF A FAILURE TO GIVE NOTICE OF A MERGER
If the parties to the merger agreement consummate the merger without having notified
the FCO, and without being released in terms of Part III.D.3 above, they can be fined up
to DM 1 million or up to three times the amount of the additional revenues realized through
the offence." The amount of the additional revenues can be assessed.
Notably, under section 30 of the German Public Offences Act (Ordungswidrigkeitengesetz),
which is different from EU law, in addition to the aforementioned fines addressed to the
32. Id. § 19(3) sentence 2.
33. Id. § 19(2) sentence 1 (2).
34. Id. § 40(3) sentence 2.
35. Id. § 42.
36. Id. § 81(1) no. 1 and (2) sentence 1.
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participating companies, individual Members of the Board and Managing Directors might
be fined personally.
Moreover, under German civil law, the merger agreement violating the prohibition of
consummation would be null and void. 7 Only agreements under the Conversion Act (Um-
wandlungsgesetz), agreements on the integration of a company into another (Eingliederungs-
vertrge), agreements to establish a company, and agreements in terms of sections 291 and
292 of the Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz, including for example, profit transfer agree-
ments) are exempted from the aforementioned rule of invalidity if they are registered validly
in the competent Register.
C. CONSEQUENCES OF A FAILURE TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE CONSUMMATION OF A MERGER
An intentional or negligent failure to notify the FCO of the consummation of a merger
can result in a fine of up to DM 50,000.38 The same applies to false, incomplete, or late
notifications.
D. LIMITED POWERS OF THE FCO IN CASES OF MERGERS REALIZED OUTSIDE OF GERMANY
Mergers that are realized in Germany, irrespective of the law the companies have legit-
imately chosen, are subject to binding German antitrust law and, therefore, to the require-
ments and powers of the FCO, as described above.
Respectively, mergers that are realized outside of Germany are subject foremost to the
applicable law of the foreign country in which the merger is carried out. Nevertheless, if
such mergers exercised abroad, as explained above, have a Domestic Effect, the GWB is
applicable and, in principle, the FCO can prohibit these mergers or levy fines in cases where
the parties did not give notice of the merger appropriately.
However, in the event a merger is executed outside of Germany, the powers of the FCO
are limited under public international law.39
First, the principles of public international law bind the FCO, as a German public au-
thority, to the territory of Germany. Thus, the FCO is "only" competent and empowered
to prohibit a merger realized abroad to the extent it has a restraining effect on a German
market. Therefore, transactions consummated in spite of the prohibition of consummation
under section 41(1) sentence 1 GWB, are only invalid under German civil law if and to the
extent they are consummated in Germany. This might be of paramount importance in the
individual case since, under private international law and the respective material German
law, certain legal measures must be carried out in Germany in order to become legally
binding. In particular, the transfer of shares in a GmbH 4° or the transfer of real property4'
seated in Germany requires a notarization in front of a German notary,4 irrespective of the
law the parties have chosen.
37. Id. § 41(1) sentence 2.
38. § 81(1) no. 4 and (2) sentence 1.
39. See Gerhard Wiedemann, § 5 FxtraterritorialeAnwendung der Wettbewerbsregeln, in HANDBUCH DES KAR-
TELLRECHTS annot. 3 (Gerhard Wiedemann ed., 1999).
40. See § 15 paras. 3 and 4 of the German Limited Liability Companies Act.
41. See § 925 para. I of the German Civil Code.
42. The possibility to notarize a transfer of shares in a GmbH and real property in front of a notary with
registered offices in certain regions of Switzerland, which is the usual practice in transactions of significant size,
is not the subject of this article.
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Additionally, only in the event a merger is at least partially realized in Germany can the
FCO serve an official writ addressed to the foreign enterprise via its representatives in
Germany (i.e., managers of branches or subsidiaries or, the interpretation of this provision
in the Act remains unclear, other individuals or companies the FCO considers to be au-
thorized to represent the companies) and is entitled to levy fines. Therefore, since fines of
the FCO are not enforceable outside of Germany, the FCO cannot levy a fine if none of
the parties involved has neither its seat nor a representative in Germany.
Furthermore, when deciding upon a prohibition, even when there is a link to the German
territory as described above, the FCO must consider both the appropriateness of a prohi-
bition and the impact of such a prohibition on the sovereignty of the countries concerned
with respect to the public international law principles of the prohibition to interfere (Ein-
mischungsverbot) and the comity of nations.43 The FCO must weigh the type and extent of
the foreign country's legitimate interest in applying its own law to a transaction carried out
by its domestic companies under such law on the one hand, and the link of the participating
companies to the German legal system and the extent and likelihood of a potential effect
on German markets on the other.44 If the FCO determines that, based upon the above
criteria, the foreign country has a clear, overriding interest in applying its own law to the
specific case, the FCO shall refrain from enforcing German law.
In practice, the FCO particularly will consider and discuss with the parties whether any
commitments to sell certain assets or subsidiaries or to grant licenses to competitors also
could abolish the authority's concerns for the market structure in Germany.
It remains unclear whether the courts will accept the FCO's approach to enforce the
German merger control rules by prohibiting only a part of a transaction and, thereby,
splitting the merger project into two parts, an approach that it followed in the
Linde/Lansing case.4 In this 1989 case, the FCO decided to prohibit the consummation
of the proposed merger only with respect to transactions within Germany and left the
transactions abroad, in this case in the United Kingdom, though belonging and integral to
the overall proposed structure, aside. The FCO particularly did not consider the U.K.
transaction as an illegal consummation of a merger falling within the scope of the pre-
merger filing requirements requiring release by the FCO. In the course of the litigation
proceedings, the Court of Appeals in Berlin (Kammergericht)46 shared that approach to
distinguish a "German part" and a "non-German part" of the merger project to be handled
separately. However, the Supreme Court (BundesgerichtshoJ)47 revised the decisions of the
FCO and the Court of Appeals in Berlin. In short, the Supreme Court argued that, with
respect to the close intermediate economic relations between the German and the non-
German part of the merger project and, in the particular case that involved exclusive Ii-
43. See Wiedemann, supra note 39, at annots. 7 and 25.
44. See Decision of the Federal Cartel Office of April 15, 1993, in WIRTSCHAFT UND WETTBEWERB,
ENTSCHEIDUNGSSAMMLUNG ZUM KARTELLRECHT, BUNDESKARTELLAMT [Economy and Competition, Compilation
of Anti-trust Decisions, Federal Cartel Office] [hereinafter WuW/E BKartA] 2521, 2540 (1993); Wiedemann,
supra note 39, at annot. 40.
45. Decision of the Federal Cartel Office of March 3, 1989, in WuW/E BKartA, supra note 44, at 2363
(1989); Wiedemann, supra note 39, at annot. 46.
46. Judgment of the Court of Appeals of Berlin of March 22, 1990, in DiE AKTENGSEILLSCHArr [hereinafter
AG] 545 (1990).
47. Judgment of the Supreme Court of December 10, 1991, in WuW/E BGH, supra note 20, at 2731,2737
(1991).
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censes, in light of the consequences of a partial prohibition for the free trade of goods
within the European Union, such distinction was inappropriate and a partial prohibition
unjustified.
The aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court has been interpreted in many dif-
ferent ways and, therefore, its consequences for the determination of the powers of the
FCO to prohibit mergers realized abroad remain unclear. The FCO subsequently prohib-
ited merger projects realized abroad that it considered to have a restraining Domestic Effect
entirely by referring to the economical impossibility of a splitting of the proposed trans-
action and by arguing that the effects abroad in these cases were of minor relevance com-
pared with the effects in Germany.48 It remains to be seen which route the FCO finally will
take. In past practice, concerns of the FCO in most cases are resolved through respective
commitments of the parties.
To summarize, the FCO's authority to both prohibit mergers realized abroad and levy
fines in respect thereof is limited. Due to the necessity of reviewing the kind and economical
impact of the individual merger project, it is hard to predict the decision of the FCO and
the courts in the particular case. However, if there is a branch or subsidiary in Germany
and if at least one party (including activities of subsidiaries) achieves a turnover of at least
DM 50 million in Germany, the parties have to notify the FCO of the merger project.
Nevertheless, at least with respect to further investments and business activities in Germany,
it is strongly recommended, even in cases where there is no branch or subsidiary in Ger-
many, to observe the aforementioned rules of German merger control. In accordance with
the aforementioned instruction of the Federal Minister of Economics (Bundesministerfiir
Wirtschaft) of 1980 (see supra Part VB), the FCO might decide on such notification in a
timely manner.
VII. Glossary of Important Terms
With respect to the aforementioned, it is necessary to explain how the terms enterprise,
merger, consummation, turnover, and market are defined in the GWB and/or construed by
the FCO and the courts.
A. ENTERPRISE
The GWB applies to all individuals, corporations, partnerships, or other entities regard-
less of their legal form, private or public purpose, or their seat engaged in business activities.
An intention to make profits is not required, thus, write-off companies are also included
within this definition. However, private investors (individuals or groups of individuals) are
only deemed enterprises if and to the extent that they hold majority interests in companies. 49
For assessing the effects of a merger and in order to calculate the turnover figures, the
economic units (einheitliche Unternehmen) must be considered that might consist of different
legal entities. According to section 36(2) sentence 1 GWB, if a participating enterprise
48. See Decision of the Federal Cartel Office of April 15, 1993, in WuW/E BKartA, supra note 42, at 2521,
2540 (1993); Decision of the Federal Cartel Office ofJuly 23, 1992, in AG, supra note 44, at 363, 367 (1992);
Decision of the Federal Cartel Office of August 23, 1989, in WuW/E BKartA, supra note 42, at 2405, 2412
(1989).
49. GWIB § 36(3).
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constitutes a dependent or a dominating enterprise within the meaning of section 17 of the
Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz) or a group enterprise (Konzernunternehmen) within
the meaning of section 18 of the Stock Corporation Act, then the enterprises connected in
such way are deemed to constitute an economic unit, which leads to the aforementioned
consequences. Dependent companies in terms of section 17 of the Stock Corporation Act
are separate legal entities over which another enterprise (dominating enterprise) is able to
exert, directly or indirectly, a controlling influence. An enterprise, the majority of shares of
which are held by another company, is deemed to be controlled by its parent company. In
accordance with section 18 of the Stock Corporation Act, if a dominating and one or more
dependent enterprises are subject to the common direction of the dominating enterprise,
such enterprises shall constitute a group and the individual enterprise shall constitute group
enterprises. Moreover, enterprises that are parties to a control agreement in terms of section
291 of the Stock Corporation Act (Beherrschungsvertrag) or that have been integrated into
the other in terms of section 319 of the Stock Corporation Act are deemed to be subject
to a common direction. Separate legal entities that are subject to a common direction
constitute a group of enterprises even though none of the enterprises controls the other.
Each of several enterprises acting together in a way that might jointly result in a domi-
nating influence over another enterprise is regarded as a dominating enterprise.
B. MERGER
Mergers (Zusammenschlisse) are defined exclusively under section 37 GWB. The term
includes asset deals, share deals, certain agreements, and other measures that enable a com-
pany to control another company.
1. Asset Dealss°
According to section 37(1) no. 1 GWB, the acquisition of all of the assets or of a sub-
stantial portion of the assets of an enterprise falls within the scope of merger control under
the GWB. A portion of the assets can be substantial in terms of quantity (acquisition of a
large portion of all the assets) and/or quality (acquisition of a separate business unit as
indicated, for example, by distinct products, personnel, machines, customers, etc.).
Notably, the FCO and the BGH assume that this term covers any acquisition of assets
that might have a significant effect on the market position of the acquirer. Therefore, they
applied this provision even to the transfer of a mere trademark, which, however, constituted
the main value of the target."'
2. Direct or Indirect Control2
Additionally, a merger in terms of the GWB arises if one or more enterprises achieve
direct or indirect control over the entirety or parts of another enterprise or other enter-
prises. Control can be exercised by right, agreement, or other means that, exclusively or
jointly, and with respect to the specific factual and legal situation, presents an opportunity
to exercise a dominating influence on another enterprise." This clause in particular includes
50. Id. § 37(1) no. 1.
51. See Judgment of the Supreme Court of July 7, 1992, in WuW/E BGH, supra note 20, at 2783, 2785
(1992).
52. GWB § 37(t) no. 2.
53. Id.
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property rights and use regarding the entirety or parts of the assets of an enterprise as well
as rights and agreements granting a dominating influence on the establishment and the
decisions of a board of the enterprise (i.e., the managing directors or at least one of the
boards of the enterprise).
3. Share Deals5 4
The acquisition of shares in another enterprise is a merger within the meaning of section
37(1) no. 3 sentences 1 and 2 GWB if these shares alone or together with shares already
held by the acquirer or its subsidiaries or trustees:
" equal or exceed twenty-five percent of the share capital or the voting rights of the target
company; or
" equal or exceed fifty percent of the share capital or the voting rights of the target
company.
Section 37(1) no. 3 GWB covers not only the initial acquisition that leads to the passing
of the twenty-five percent threshold but also the subsequent acquisition that then surpasses
the fifty percent threshold. The acquisition of shares by investment banks, financial insti-
tutions, or insurance companies is not deemed to constitute a merger if the shares are
acquired in order to resell them and if such resale is executed within one year, unless the
acquirers exercise their voting rights conferred upon them by the shares."
4. Joint Ventures56
According to section 37(l) no. 3 sentence 3 GWB, the simultaneous or subsequent ac-
quisition of shares in another enterprise by several enterprises to an extent of twenty-five
percent or fifty percent each, constitutes, apart from the vertical mergers between each of
the acquirers and the target enterprise, a horizontal merger between the acquirers regarding
those markets within which the joint venture is active (assumption of a partial merger, which
reflects the group effects between the acquiring companies). If the joint venture is not yet
established or not yet active, one must refer to the market that will be entered."
5. Other Forms of Material Influence8
Moreover, the GWB assumes a merger when a transaction involves any other combi-
nation of enterprises according to which one or more enterprises achieves directly or in-
directly an influence upon another enterprise that is material with regard to competition. 9
This provision will particularly cover the acquisition of minority participation (less than
twenty-five percent of the Share Capital) whereas such shares in addition with further
circumstances (e.g., the need to request approval of the minority shareholder for certain
activities) give the minority shareholder an extraordinary position.
6. Increase of Participation
A merger is also assumed even if the merging companies are already affiliated, unless the
already existing relationship between the enterprises is not strengthened substantially as a
54. Id. § 37(1) no. 3 sentences 1 and 2.
55. Id. § 37(3).
56. Id. § 37(1) no. 3 sentence 3.
57. See Hans-Jiirgen Ruppelt, § 23 GWB, in Langen & Bunte, supra note 12, at annot. 52.
58. GWB § 37(1) no. 4.
59. Id.
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result of the further acquisition. 60 A substantial strengthening is considered a merger, for
example, if the fifty percent threshold will be surpassed or if agreements are concluded that
grant additional influence or control.
C. CONSUMMATION OF A MERGER
According to section 41(1) sentence 1 GWB, the enterprises are prohibited from con-
summating or participating in consummating the merger, unless the specific time periods
have expired or the FCO has released the merger plan. When a merger is deemed to be
consummated depends on the point in time when the specific transactions become effective.
In particular, a conditional transaction or a transaction that is to become effective at a later
point in time is not yet consummated in terms of the GWB until the condition is fulfilled
or before the agreed date. Therefore, the parties to the merger agreement often agree to
a clause according to which the coming into force of the merger agreement is subject to
the condition precedent that the FCO has released the transaction or is prevented from
prohibiting the merger by expiration of the respective period. In these cases, the merger
plan is consummated automatically upon the fulfillment of such condition.
D. RELEVANT TURNOVER FIGURES
It is the GWB's approach to merger control to require the notification of mergers not
with respect to the market shares concerned (this aspect will, nevertheless, be taken into
consideration to answer the question whether a market-dominating position would be cre-
ated or strengthened) but because of the turnover volume of the participating enterprises.
In order to determine which companies' turnovers must be considered in calculating the
relevant turnover, one must distinguish asset deals from other forms of mergers. When
assets are to be sold, one must consider the seller's turnover resulting from these assets,
that is, if a production facility is going to be sold, the turnover generated by selling the
products made in this production facility must be considered.61 This turnover, added to the
acquirer's turnover is the relevant turnover in asset deals.
In the case of a share deal and in all other forms of mergers, the entire turnover of the
targeted legal entity must be added to the acquirer's turnover.
Moreover, in the case of a joint venture, for purposes of determining the notification
requirements, the turnover of any company holding stock in the joint venture company of
at least twenty-five percent must be added (see supra Part VII.B.4).
The notification requirements focus on the annual worldwide turnover of the partici-
pating enterprises for the preceding fiscal year, which includes the sales of all affiliated
enterprises of a group (parent and sister enterprises as well as subsidiaries) in all branches,
regardless of whether these branches are affected by the merger plan. Therefore, all enter-
prises directly or indirectly controlled by the acquirer or the target as well as the enterprises
controlling the acquirer are deemed to be participating.
The turnover must be computed on a consolidated basis, thus excluding intercompany
transactions. Value-added tax and consumption taxes are also not to be included in the
calculation. Special rules apply with respect to sales of distribution enterprises, banks, in-
surance enterprises, and publishers of newspapers and periodicals.62 Turnover that is gen-
60. Id. § 37(2).
61. Id. § 38(5).
62. Id. § 38(2) to (4).
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erated in foreign currencies will usually be calculated by converting them into German
marks using the official annual average exchange rates published by the European Central
Bank. The currencies that are part of the EURO zone are calculated on the basis of the
known fixed converting rates.
E. RELEVANT MARKET
Goods and services belong to a single product market if they are interchangeable in terms
of function, preference, and price from the point of view of the average customer of services
or buyer of products, who is not necessarily the end consumer. For determining such mar-
ket, the FCO, if possible, refers to governmental statistics or data rendered by associations
of the manufacturers of the goods in question or by lobbyists. Nevertheless, the FCO is
not bound to these statements and is generally entitled to determine and examine the
markets and their structure on its own. To determine the geographic market, the FCO
usually considers Germany as one market, unless there are specific reasons to distinguish
regional markets. Market shares usually are calculated based upon value, which means with
reference to the entire sales figures in German marks for that market.
VIII. Summary
To summarize, the Amendment to the GWB brought on the one hand a number of
significant changes, particularly with respect to the scope of the law's applicability. On the
other hand, the procedural requirements for notifying a merger remained mainly the same.
In the course of harmonizing the German and the EU merger control provisions, the new
GWB specifically refrains from drawing any distinction between pre- and post-merger
controls. While pre-merger control was extended by already including transactions involv-
ing companies with a worldwide turnover of DM 1 billion, the de minimis exemptions for
a so-called affiliation and insignificant markets are simultaneously extended. Moreover,
notification is required only where at least one company achieves a turnover in Germany
exceeding DM 50 million. Notably, the Federal Minister of Economics will still be entitled
to release a merger with respect to an extraordinary public interest.
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